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Abstract 
How much does stimulus input shape perception? The common-sense view is that our 
perceptions are representations of objects and their features and that the stimulus structures the 
perceptual object. The problem for this view concerns perceptual biases as responsible for 
distortions and the subjectivity of perceptual experience. These biases are increasingly studied as 
constitutive factors of brain processes in recent neuroscience. In neural network models the brain 
is said to cope with the plethora of sensory information by predicting stimulus regularities on the 
basis of previous experiences. Drawing on this development, this chapter analyses perceptions as 
processes. Looking at olfaction as a model system, it argues for the need to abandon a stimulus-
centred perspective, where smells are thought of as stable percepts, computationally linked to 
external objects such as odorous molecules. Perception here is presented as a measure of 
changing signal ratios in an environment informed by expectancy effects from top-down 
processes. 
Keywords 
anticipation; computationalism; forecasting; neural networks; neuroscience; olfaction; perceptual 
bias; predictive coding; smell 
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Measuring the World 
Olfaction as a Process Model of Perception 
Ann-Sophie Barwich 
1. Introduction: Why Things Stink 
What is the first thing you do when you open a box of milk, especially if it has stayed a few days 
longer in the fridge and may have gone off? You take a whiff. Although popular opinion sticks 
to the idea that the human sense of smell is declining and unimportant, this is a blatant 
misconception.1 Your nose actually is the most accurate and sensitive chemosensor on earth. It 
detects the slightest changes in the chemical composition of your environment, and it does so 
with striking precision. A difference in one atom of two otherwise perfectly similar molecules 
can cause your perception of their odour quality to vary entirely. For instance, take nonanoic acid 
                                                
1 The most popular and persistent opinions about our sense of smell are that it is declining, that it is 
evolutionary unimportant to humans, and that other animals such as dogs are much better at smelling. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Neither is the sense of smell declining nor is the human sense 
of smell considerably worse than the olfactory abilities of dogs. For a popular science account of smell 
and for debunking such myths, see Gilbert 2008; Shepherd 2012; and Barwich 2016; for a scientific 
review of the importance of the olfactory system in molecular biology and neuroscience, see Firestein 
2001; Shepherd 2004; and Barwich 2015b. 
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(CH3(CH2)7COOH; Figure 17.1a), which smells of cheese. If you add only one carbon atom, you 
get decanoic acid (CH3(CH2)8COOH; Figure 17.1b), which you will perceive distinctly different, 
as smelling rancid! 
<COMP: INSERT FIGURE 17.1 NEAR HERE> 
While your olfactory system is mind-bogglingly precise in its capacity to detect the slightest 
changes in chemical variation, it is also incredibly flexible in its processing. Think about the 
wide range of responses to smells: certain odours evoke an immediate and almost universal dis-
liking (e.g., the smell of cadaverine, NH2(CH2)5NH2, is not something you will consider 
pleasant), but many other odours tend to carry individually variable associations—variable 
depending on their familiarity and on memories of previous encounters. 
This dual character, the flexibility of perceptual interpretation in parallel with the precision 
of its molecular detection mechanism, makes olfaction an excellent model system for renewing 
philosophical attention to perception. Perceptual analysis has traditionally concentrated on visual 
perception. In recent years, the neglect of what is often referred to as ‘the other senses’ has 
started to become a matter of correction, though.2 Nonetheless, olfaction remains the most 
neglected sense among these laudable developments. 
Smell has long constituted the problem child for philosophers of perception because of its 
apparent lack of representational capacities. Odours are experienced, but in what way does this 
constitute representational content? This question has been traditionally addressed by debating 
the representational nature of odours as corresponding to objects (see the essays in the thematic 
issue of Keller and Young 2014). Such approach centres on the nature of the stimulus as defining 
perceptual content. In light of recent developments in cognitive neuroscience, I propose an 
alternative to that view in this chapter. 
                                                
2 For reviews, see audition (O’Callaghan 2014), touch (Fulkerson 2015), taste, and flavour (Smith 2012; 
Spence 2013). 
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Perception here is analysed as a process. The thrust of my argument is, in brief, that we need 
to abandon a stimulus-centred point of view where we think of smells as stable percepts that are 
computationally linked to external objects such as odorous molecules. There are no stable and 
intrinsic links between chemicals or input sources and our perceptions, such as of odour 
qualities. Denying that input sources are the primary element in perceptual analysis does not lead 
to a denial of their causal and functional significance, however. Once this proposition is clear, a 
very large part of the philosophical motivation to oppose the perceptual model advanced here 
should vanish. Instead, we must consider flexible and contextual aspects of the process to 
understand what it is that we perceive from odorous molecules through our sense of smell. 
Smells, the argument proceeds, are not so much about objects and stable object perception 
as about changes in the chemical composition of the environment and flexibility in terms of its 
contextual evaluation. In the course of percept formation, sensory input is filtered and structured 
by different anticipatory processes. What we perceive is highly dependent on a signal’s 
combination with other sensory cues, previous experiences, and expectations of what options a 
signal affords. 
The informational content of smell must not be analysed as perceptual instances in terms of 
classes of ‘odour objects’ (e.g. rose), but with respect to ‘odour situations’ where input cues are 
integrated in terms of their temporal and contextual associations with other external sensory 
cues, internal hidden states (experience and memory-based, or internally inferred), expectations 
or predictions, and feedback processes of error correction. A number of processes can cause 
certain odour qualities to become more prominent in a percept, allowing for semantic 
associations with previously encountered smells. Other processes facilitate the variability of 
semantic associations in smell perception. In order to understand the informational content and 
identify the perceptual dimensions in olfaction we must model odours after the processes that 
facilitate signal pattern separation and completion. 
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In this chapter I elaborate on the scientific foundations and philosophical implications of this 
idea. That said, the perspective on perception advanced in what follows is not meant to carve out 
olfaction as necessarily different from the visual or auditory system. Rather, it is intended to 
refine our perspective on the variable factors that determine perceptual content. Olfaction in this 
context bears interest, as it seems to possess a less intuitive perceptual structure than vision and, 
as a result, a less deceptively straightforward relation between sensory input and perceptual 
content. 
The starting point of this chapter is to engage with the received view in philosophical studies 
that considers the distal stimulus as the central element for the analysis of perceptual content 
(Lycan 2000; Batty 2010a, 2912b, 2013; Keller and Young 2014; Keller 2015). Having outlined 
what constitutes the general challenge here, namely the inadequacy of talk about odour objects, I 
turn to current scientific studies on the neural basis of olfaction. These studies highlight the non-
linearity of stimulus processing and demonstrate the impact of top-down mechanisms in 
olfaction, and I analyse these experimental developments in the context of an alternative 
framework as emerging in cognitive neuroscience. The central proposal here is to model the 
brain in terms of two complementary and simultaneous processes as the integrated proximal 
stimulus: perceptual bias as anticipation and bias correction as revision. I conclude with a 
disambiguation of the different meanings of anticipatory processes that regulate perception; and I 
present perception as a process that measures changing signal ratios in the environment and is 
shaped by expectancy effects in perceptual content formation. 
2. The Received View: The Input Determines the Perceptual 
Experience 
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In some ways the philosophical analysis of perception used to suffer from the same problems as 
certain parts of theoretical physics: concepts originate purely from theory, and there often is no 
way to see how foolproof the grounds for the relevant theoretical convictions really are without 
guided experimental manipulation. Contemporary philosophy of perception has experienced a 
great deal of change and challenges in parallel with the rise of cognitive neuroscience over the 
past decade, however. The essential tension surrounds the double understanding and analysis of 
perception (1) as a representation of external objects (distal stimulus) and (2) as a result of the 
neural processes generating stimulus patterns (proximal stimulus). 
Take the common-sense idea that our perceptions are shaped by what we perceive: we 
consider our perceptions to be representations of objects and their features in the world. 
Philosophers of perception have been careful not to confound perceptual representation with 
neural representation, and instead have focused on the distal stimulus input as the measure by 
which we must judge the content of our perceptions. What are the grounds for this view, and 
what reason is there to reconsider the relation between perceptual and neural representation? 
Let’s start with the traditional philosophical notion of a ‘percept’. Although there seems to 
be no formal definition of what a percept is, it is commonly used to refer to the perceptual 
experience that results from the act of perceiving. Our percepts are considered to be about things 
in the world, and understanding this aboutness or intentionality of perception is one of the major 
occupations in philosophical discourse (Peacocke 2008). For example, my perception of the cup 
of coffee in front of me is going to tell me something about it, such as its colour, shape, and size. 
But how shall we model and analyse the content of our perceptual attention to the world? 
The philosophical literature has produced numerous arguments on this topic (for a review, 
see Crane and French 2016). Large parts of the debate concern whether such perceptual 
experiences are truthful or accurate representations of the things we perceive in the world (Akins 
1996). Central to this inquiry is the distinction between perceptual appearance and reality. What 
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unites the bulk of philosophical arguments on this topic is concern about the source of perception 
and its elemental primacy for perceptual analysis. The shared hypothesis about the directionality 
of the perceptual process is clear: the input structures the perceptual content. What does that 
mean? And does this apply to olfaction? 
The common-sense idea that perception is about objects originates from our dominantly 
‘visuocentric’ theories. It has led some philosophers of mind to the question of what might 
constitute ‘odour objects’. Four suggestions are offered in the literature: (i) smells represent 
ordinary objects (like roses, wine, or Brussels sprouts); (ii) smells represent clouds of odorous 
molecules; (iii) smells represent chemical features of molecules; or (iv) smells may be purely 
subjective phenomenological experiences or sensations that do not present us with propositions 
specifying particular objects in the world (for different positions, see Lycan 2000; Batty 2010a, 
2010b; Keller and Young 2014). Analysis here centres on the assessment of perceptual ‘object 
failure’, meaning ‘the failure of an experience to present objects accurately’ (or to present any 
objects at all; see Batty 2010b: 10).3 
A lot of arguments in this debate concern the effect of the visual presence of a source object 
on olfactory experience (particularly in the work of Lycan and Batty). Notably, this effect has 
been characterized by the olfactory physiologist Hans Henning as early as in 1916. Henning 
drew a conceptual distinction between ‘the true odor [Gegebenheitsgeruch], which is obtained by 
the observer who is smelling with closed eyes and is ignorant of the nature of the scent, and the 
object smell [Gegenstandsgeruch], which (like color) is projected upon the objects from which it 
is known to come and apt to be distorted by associative supplementing’ (Henning in Gamble’s 
translation, in Gamble 1921: 292). Eleanor Gamble’s translation of the German 
Gegebenheitsgeruch as ‘the true odor’ is misleading, however, as the literal meaning is ‘the 
                                                
3 Alternatively, a discussion about the question of whether we can perceive absences in olfaction as being 
objectless can be found in Roberts 2015. 
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situation odour’. For Henning, such perceptual effects presented important methodological 
factors for psychophysical measurement, not a measure of the ‘truthfulness’ of odour objects. 
There are several philosophical difficulties involved in defining olfactory objecthood (for an 
extensive analysis, see Keller 2015). Some of the arguments about the nature of odour objects, 
namely for their being (ii) clouds of molecules or (iii) particular features of molecules, fail to 
distinguish between the stimulus as the cause of perception and the perceptual object as the 
content of perception. This view also runs into scientific problems. To date, there are no known 
structure–odour relationship rules (i.e. regularities linking specific chemical features and the 
smell of a molecule), and the causal features of odorants (i.e. the odorous molecules) are 
dependent on receptor behaviour, not vice versa (Barwich 2015a, 2015b; Poivet et al. 2016). 
Moreover, and as I explain in the next section, smell is not only determined by molecule–
receptor interactions, but also significantly dependent on higher-level brain processes. 
Arguments for (i) (i.e. a semantic understanding of odour objects as ordinary objects) run 
into trouble as well. Suffice it to say that some smells, such as artistic perfumes, do not 
necessarily have associations with ordinary objects. Even ordinary objects give off hundreds of 
odorants, and each one is not only different from the others but also distributed from its source at 
a different temporal scale from theirs (this is also the basic principle in the composition of 
alcohol-based perfumes). 
A layered account for odour objects as being a combination of semantic (= (i)) and causal (= 
(ii), (iii)) objecthood does not present an intuitive or clear criterion for an odour object either. 
‘Layered’ means, according to Lycan (2014), that odour perceptions can be veridical in two 
independent ways: first, on a lower-level account of representation in terms of its causal objects 
(i.e. I perceive, correctly, the presence of a cloud of molecules as the causal object); and, second, 
on a higher-level account of representation in terms of its semantic associations (i.e. I perceive, 
correctly, a cloud of molecules as a rose). Such a model of differentiating the truth values of (i) 
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and (ii), (iii) remains far too uninformative and further runs into trouble once we consider the 
different variables regarding the distal stimulus as well as its associated semantic content. For 
example, the attempt to link the smell of ordinary objects such as roses to particular (clouds of) 
molecules (or their features) is 
[a]n innocent approach when we know that the scent of a rose comprises hundreds 
of different molecules and that none of them smells like a rose. So far I have not 
found ‘the’ rose molecule, but I have discovered that the smells of flowers have a 
biologically dictated cycle, and that their composition can vary significantly 
without them losing their identity. (Ellena 2012, Cabris Thursday 22 July 2010).4  
Dominant focus on veridical object representation in perceptual analysis further falls short of 
several key aspects of olfactory experience. First, it ignores the purpose of smelling: ‘Stimulus 
representation isn’t the primary business of olfaction. Rather, its job is solving a problem of 
valuation, rapidly encoding the biological salience of a stimulus and priming our multisensory 
representation of it to contextually appropriate action’ (Castro and Seeley 2014, 1). As other 
philosophers and scientists have pointed out (Burge 2010; Keller 2015), the biological function 
of perception is prior to representational accuracy in an evolutionary reading of sensory systems. 
Perceptions here are primarily understood to facilitate the achievement of organismal goals such 
as the four Fs (fighting, fleeing, feeding, and courtship). While the truthful representation of the 
world can coincide with the achievement of these biological functions, it need not. 
                                                
4 To be sure, the basic rose smell is more likely composed of dozens, not hundreds, of molecules. The 
main point of this statement remains valid, however. 
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Second, object-centred representational analysis remains indeterminate and misleading with 
respect to the perceptual dimensions and the structure of olfactory experience.5 What is the 
structure of odour perceptions? To be sure, olfactory information is spatially and temporarily 
structured in the environment. In humans and other animals it can be used for navigation and 
active exploration (Porter et al. 2007), and we recognize temporal patterns of changes in the 
olfactory environment on shorter and longer scales, such as circadian and annual fluctuations of 
smells (Keller 2015). That said, we must be careful not to equate the external structure of a 
signal with the structure of our perceptual experience. 
Human olfaction is generally characterized as being temporal but as lacking spatial 
dimensions in its perceptual content. It is temporal in a phenomenological sense, as smells 
appear to be perceived now, and they act as an indicator of the presence of something. Olfaction 
is also temporal, in the sense that we perceive important changes in the chemical constitution of 
our environment. As we are constantly surrounded by hundreds of airborne molecules, our 
olfactory system is tuned to this situation by quickly adapting to stable ratios of odorants, so that 
neural populations fire more actively when novel stimuli are encountered. In comparison, spatial 
structure in perception is characterized as exhibiting perceptual relations in terms of position, 
orientation, or directness (Keller 2015). As odours do not exhibit such spatial structuring and ‘we 
do far less of that sort of objectification’ in olfaction, this has led some philosophers to believe 
that ‘smell, in humans, is informationally very poor’ (Lycan 2000: 277) and lacks ‘articulate 
individuation’ (Lycan 2000, 282). 
Such a judgement conveys a blatant misunderstanding of what olfaction is for. Information 
is an ambiguous and multifaceted notion, especially with respect to organisms and their sensory 
systems. I ask you instead, how many different smells can you perceive? Scientifically speaking, 
                                                
5 I have argued in more detail elsewhere why I consider object-centred representational analyses of smells 
to be ill informed with regard to categories of sensory measurement (Barwich 2014). 
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olfactory quality space is multiscaled and consists of hundreds or thousands of different odours 
(though the precise number and the usefulness of counting are matters of debate; see Bushdid et 
al. 2014; Meister 2015; and Magnasco, Keller, and Vosshall 2015). Furthermore, why do you 
consider an odour to be pleasant or unpleasant (and when or for how long)? It is rather curious 
how much the hedonic tone of odours seems to escape philosophical ideas about perception; one 
might blame for this the heritage of the Enlightenment’s mirthless philosophy of the senses 
(Classen, Howes, and Synnott 1994). Likewise, how much does the context of your encounter 
with a stimulus and its combination with other sensory cues shape its perceptual content? The 
most obvious example of the informational richness and context-sensitivity in olfactory 
perception is the complexity of flavours (Shepherd 2012, Smith 2012, Spence 2013). Your 
perception of food and beverage flavour is dominated by your sense of smell, more specifically 
retro-nasal (or mouth-breathing) olfaction. Humans have developed highly sophisticated 
discriminatory abilities when it comes to flavours. 
Overall, such a differentiated account of perceptual information invites us to rethink our 
standard approach to perception. Regarding the inadequacy of talk about odour objects, other 
philosophers have suggested adopting suggestion (iv) and simply rejecting an object-
representational account, but viewing smells as subjective phenomenological experiences or as 
‘feels’ that are somewhat ‘free-floating’ or ‘objectless’ (Batty 2010a, 2010b). It remains unclear 
what precise understanding of odours is gained through this proposal, however. Detaching 
philosophical analysis of smell from objects and seeing perceptions as mere sensations does not 
account for the purpose of odour perception as a measure of chemical changes in your 
environment. It does not explain how we should understand the role of the stimulus as an 
informational signal for a specific sensory system. Thus this chapter advocates that the structure 
of the perceptual image must be modelled after the processes it serves. But what are these 
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processes? And how can we think about the informational dimensions of signals in terms of 
sensory systems and their regulatory principles? 
3. The Neural Basis of Olfaction and the Idea of Forecasting 
in Perception 
Input-centred modelling of the senses has not been restricted to philosophical debate. Its 
equivalent in neuroscience is the view that the organization of a sensory system such as the 
visual or the auditory one is shaped primarily by the incoming signal. Basically, this expresses 
the idea that external stimuli are recognized by our sensory systems and translated into internal 
representations by means of topographically organized brain activation patterns that further 
facilitate behavioural responses to certain stimuli. The resulting input–output model of 
perception has been crucial for successful developments in visual research, especially throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s (Marr 2010 [1982]), as well as influencing research on other sensory 
systems such as olfaction (Davis and Eichenbaum 1992). 
Meanwhile this standard bottom-up version of computationalism has been challenged and 
modified.6 Over the past decade, sensory and computational neuroscience has provided much 
                                                
6 The implicitly unidirectional and monocausal input-to-output interpretation of sensory processing has 
elicited various criticisms and suggested alternatives over the years, especially in philosophy. Most 
prominently, theories of action, enactivism, and embodiment have argued against the differentiation 
between perception, body, and the environment (for an extensive review, see Hurley 2001). Overall, 
these theories view the body as a condition and constraint for forming percepts so that we are able to 
interact with our environment through sensory experiences. Or, more briefly put, the state of your body 
affects the state of your perception and, in turn, of your cognition. On this account, behavioural or 
motor output and sensory input are coupled and analysed in relation to each other (Varela, Thompson, 
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more advanced models and analysis of higher-level brain processing. While we should not 
equate the analysis of the sensory processes with the phenomenological character of its 
perceptual products per se, the neural pathways are the basis on which we must build and correct 
our perceptual theories. What is more, by identifying and analysing current questions in 
contemporary neuroscience, we gain a much more detailed and informative picture of what kinds 
of questions we must ask in order to reconsider some philosophical approaches to perception. 
Olfaction, again, presents us with a salient case for this. 
As a rough sketch (see Figure 17.2), the olfactory pathway is structured as follows (for a 
review, see Firestein 2001). Odorants are first detected by receptors situated on the sensory 
nerves in the nasal epithelium. All olfactory sensory neurons expressing one particular receptor 
gene (encoding a receptor type) are then collected in spherical neural structures (so-called 
glomeruli) in the olfactory bulb (at the frontal lobe of your brain). At the bulb level, a neat 
activation pattern shows up (Vassar et al. 1994; Mombaerts et al. 1996). This pattern represents 
                                                                                                                                                       
and Rosch 1991; Hurley 1998; O’Regan and Noë 2001; and Noë 2004). I have decided to exclude 
analysis of embodiment ideas in this chapter, for reasons not only of length and focus, but also of 
appropriateness: strong theories of embodiment that view perception as being somewhat in the body 
and out of our heads (Noë 2009) simply fail to resonate with numerous clinical cases, for example 
where certain disorders in the right-brain hemisphere can cause feelings of disembodiment in patients 
(see ch. 3 in Sacks 1998). However, I agree with weaker theories of embodiment that emphasize 
sensorimotor aspects of sensory systems as influencing perception (e.g. the effects of sniffing patterns 
on odour perception). One can be of a divided opinion as to whether sensorimotor effects require such 
an extensive theoretical treatment as in the case of the embodiment movement. In fact some 
psychologists have objected that the ‘basic principles from embodiment theory are either unacceptably 
vague (e.g., the premise that perception is influenced by the body) or they offer nothing new (e.g., 
cognition evolved to optimize survival, emotions affect cognition, perception–action couplings are 
important)’ (Goldinger et al. 2016: 959). I remain agnostic on this issue in this chapter. 
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the range of receptors that are activated by certain chemical features of the distal stimulus. So 
you will get a different activation pattern for a musk molecule from the one you will get for a 
citrus molecule. Now, as with the visual system, this topographic organization of the bulb was 
expected to be maintained throughout further processing stages, and the expectation was to find a 
corresponding topography in the olfactory cortex (Axel 2005). It turns out that this may not be 
the case. 
<COMP: INSERT FIGURE 17.2 NEAR HERE> 
Olfactory scientists have struggled to find any such topographic organization over the past 
ten years (Stettler and Axel 2009; Mori et al. 2006). Their efforts have largely concentrated on 
the so-called piriform cortex, which constitutes the largest part of the olfactory cortex. It was 
long assumed to be the centre of odour object formation. This means that the piriform was 
considered to be the domain in the brain where olfactory signals are combined into a unified 
odour percept. While the piriform cortex does not present us with stable input maps like the bulb, 
it has been shown to respond to different sorts of organizational regulation, however. 
On the one hand, there are findings that suggest that the piriform cortex can get trained into 
forming more or less temporally stable patterns through innate as well as through learned 
behaviour (associated with smells). This strategy is pursued for instance in Richard Axel’s lab. 
Taking full advantage of the experimental possibilities offered by novel techniques such as 
optogenetics, Axel’s team traces olfactory signalling from the bulb to the piriform cortex via the 
amygdala as a sort of ‘relay’ station (Root et al. 2014). The amygdala is part of the limbic system 
and deeply involved in processes of memory formation, decision-making, and affective 
responses. 
On the other hand, an alternative model is to ‘reverse engineer’ and ask what the signal is 
for (i.e. trace its efferent connections) rather than ask where it comes from (i.e. trace its afferent 
connections). This strategy is employed by Stuart Firestein’s lab. Firestein’s team was looking at 
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projections from two higher-level domains in the orbitofrontal cortex (the agranular insula and 
the lateral orbitofrontal cortex) back to the piriform cortex. And indeed, the team found two 
distinct neural populations with a largely non-overlapping topographic organization (Chen et al. 
2014). 
To what extent these findings will converge in a unified model of olfactory processing is an 
empirical question and presents an exciting prospect for further research in olfaction. There may 
or may not be a central domain of synthesizing or unifying olfactory experience. What these 
approaches have in common thus far is a shared focus on behaviour and learning as fundamental 
to the formation of odour objects. The amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex in particular are 
domains notable for their involvement and centrality in decision-making processes and sensory 
integration (Shadlen and Kiani 2013; Castro and Seeley 2014). 
For philosophical studies of perception, these are interesting experimental developments. 
They highlight the non-linearity of stimulus activation and representation and demonstrate the 
impact of top-down neural processing in olfaction. While research on smell lacks a general 
theory of its subsystems (integrating studies of receptor, bulb, and cortex activity), these 
experimental inquiries resonate with a general tendency in cognitive neuroscience that has 
started to pursue an alternative framework for modelling perception and cognition. The growing 
trend is to think of behavioural systems in computational terms. 
While there is no real consensus about theories of the brain to date, there is convergence on 
what aspects a genuinely alternative conceptual framework for neural processing must build on: 
bias and revision. Bias’ refers to the formation of anticipations and preferences through previous 
experiences, and revisions are processes where these biases are continuously corrected. 
Consider a great example of perceptual biases introduced by top-down processing: the role 
of expectations in flavour perception. Here we encounter numerous phenomena where the 
perception of colour or texture in foods and beverages affects our judgement about the perceived 
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gustatory qualities of these foods and beverages. In one study, test subjects were given two 
beverages of the same chemical composition, one being of a brighter colour than the other. 
Subjects perceived the brighter beverage as sweeter and more intense (Bayarri et al. 2001). 
Another study appears to ridicule sommeliers and wine tasters who were given wines to test and 
describe. The subjects in this study were presented with red wines that, unbeknownst to them, 
were in fact just white wines laced with red food colour. The tasters proceeded to attribute 
traditional red wine properties to these white wines (Hodgson 2008). 
What perceptual puzzles such as these suggest is that seemingly higher-level processes 
should not be taken as separable modules in the cognitive architecture. They are an integral part 
of our basic perceptual processing instead. As has become clear by now, perception is not 
primarily and exclusively determined by input. Most notably, this is where data from the neural 
pathway and psychophysical studies of perception converge. What we perceive with the help of 
our sensory systems is multilayered and multiprocessual: perception is dependent on a signal’s 
combination with other sensory cues, previous experiences, and expectations about the kinds of 
options this signal affords. These different processual layers are constitutive of the perceptual 
architecture and the selective biases in percept formation. But how can we model and analyse 
such seemingly bidirectional causal character of information flow in sensory processing? 
Over the past fifty years, a number of neuroscientists have suggested models of neural 
networks that build on these two processes, anticipation and revision, as complementary 
mechanisms. In these models, your brain works like a neuro-computer that copes with the 
plethora of sensory information by predicting stimulus regularities through previous experiences. 
These sensory regularities provide perceptual templates by which your brain continuously 
generates an internal virtual model or a simulation of the environment (Friston 2010; Graziano 
2013). 
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To generate such a model, the brain operates by two complementary and simultaneous 
mechanisms of top-down and bottom-up processing. ‘Top-down processing’ refers to the 
information flow from the higher cortical areas to the lower sensory domains. This top-down 
mechanism makes predictions about the environment on the basis of prior experience of stimulus 
regularities, and its activity results in so-called ‘forward models’. By comparison, bottom-up 
processing describes the information flow of stimulus input from lower sensory areas to higher-
level brain domains. Most crucially, the function of the incoming input from this bottom-up 
mechanism is defined as an error correction of the forward model. What precisely such top-down 
processes are and what constitutes the content of predictions is not obvious, as I will explain over 
the course of what follows. 
Similar models of the brain as a perceptual forecasting machine have permeated motor 
theories for decades (Bridgeman 1995, 2013). For example, one of the most salient examples for 
the role of sensorimotor prediction in perception is a phenomenon that was first described in the 
nineteenth century (Bell 1974 [1823]; Purkinje 1825; Helmholtz 1866) and later, in the mid-
twentieth century, became known as ‘efference copy’ (Holst and Mittelstaedt 1950; Sperry 
1950). Efference copy describes an effect where your brain creates a forward copy of your 
sensorimotor system, anticipating your movement in order to provide stability in motion 
perception (Bridgeman 2007). 
More recently, the idea of the brain as a forecasting processor has entered cognitive 
neuroscience and philosophy under labels such as theory of predictive coding, or the Bayesian 
brain (Friston 2010; Clark 2013; Hohwy 2013), but also as attention schema theory (Graziano 
2013). The essential components for such theories have been around for several decades and in 
various disciplines. The importance of schemata as perceptual anticipations in perceptual cycles 
and revision was put forward most prominently by the cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser 
(1976), a close colleague and office neighbour of James J. Gibson at Cornell. 
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While the various subtleties and differences in different theoretical accounts of forecasting 
mechanisms need not concern us here, what essentially unifies these approaches in my view is a 
shared outlook on the nature of perception and cognition as inherently processual. In forecasting 
models, perceptual analysis is not centred on the idea of stable piecemeal perceptual images of 
the world as representative of external objects. Rather, it concerns the dynamics between 
anticipation and correction in perception, and the processes that constitute the formative 
mechanisms of learning and revision. Such a dynamic picture accounts for the flexibility with 
which organisms are able to react to a variety of environmental changes. 
In this perspective, the links between input and output processing are deeply intertwined and 
cyclical. Their analytic differentiation is not so much of a sequential as of a functionally 
complementary nature. Therefore the first step here is to acknowledge the central difference 
from the received view, where we saw the perceptual images as a product at the end of the line 
of the perceptual mechanism. The flaw of the received view is that it obscures the constant flux 
that directs perceptual processes. Or, in Dennett’s (1993: 253) words: ‘This is like forgetting that 
the end product of apple trees is not apples—it’s more apple trees.’ This, too, holds true for 
perceptual analysis if we are forgetting that the end product of perception is not percepts—it is 
the ongoing perceptual processing. 
When we analyse perceptions in terms of such forecasting processes, our perceptual images 
are not shaped exclusively by the external input but are strongly affected by our anticipations, 
experiences, and the information context. Anticipatory processes are not some isolated effects at 
the end of higher-level cognitive processing. Rather, they resonate with neural mechanisms that 
constantly feed back into lower sensory domains and thereby influence the biochemical effects 
that produce our perceptual impressions. That said, discarding the primacy of input as structuring 
our perceptual experience does not mean that the stimulus does not play any role at all, only that 
its role must be modelled after the processes in which it participates. 
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It is one thing to say that the formation of percepts is informed by signal input but shaped by 
top-down processing. It is another to highlight the concrete aspects of top-down processing that 
benefit our understanding of perception as processes. To put some flesh and bones on this idea, I 
present the case of an alleged ‘olfactory illusion’ in the next section, before I end with the 
concrete philosophical questions that result from a perceptual model based on processes instead 
of objects. Ambiguous meanings of anticipation are the easiest place where we can situate 
prospective work for philosophers of perception—work complementary to current developments 
in cognitive neuroscience. 
4. The Interactivity of Forecasting and Stimulus Input in 
Perception 
The picture of the general framework sketched above is permissive and allows for several levels 
of description in perceptual analysis with respect to the neural and mental processes. In essence, 
the perceptual architecture we arrive at here is a relational and temporally scaffolded one: 
perceptual relations are built over several neural processing levels and temporal scales, where 
some anatomical, physiological, and experiential constituents of the perceptual process are more 
variable, contextual, or short-lived than others (e.g. exposure time to stimulus, satiety, hormonal 
states, anatomical features). Stimuli are encountered in manifold organismal states and in various 
behavioural and environmental contexts. In consequence, they are processed differently as they 
become integrated into multiple experiences and memories, and can constitute varying 
perceptions. The complex role of anticipatory processes in the formation of perceptual content 
cannot be underestimated. An example may help to further illustrate this. 
Imagine the following experiment, where I present you with a couple of odorous mixtures 
for evaluation. First I am giving you a vial to sniff that you see labelled as ‘Parmesan’; then I 
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give you one labelled as ‘vomit’. You will most likely be able to distinguish these mixtures; and 
you will probably find the latter much more disagreeable. I then repeat the same test a week 
later, only this time making you smell the ‘vomit’ vial first and giving you the one with 
‘parmesan’ next. You will still be able to tell them apart, finding the former more unpleasant this 
time. What if I tell you now that these two vials are the same mixture? Both vials contain butyric 
acid (CH3CH2CH2-COOH) with its deeply unpleasant and penetrant odour. Your expectations 
and the associations formed through the labels, however, influenced your perception of these 
otherwise chemically equivalent mixtures.7 
Indeed, such an experiment, analysing the ‘influence of verbal labeling on the perception of 
odors’ (as the title of the article indicates), has been conducted, for instance, by Herz and von 
Clef (2001). In this study the two researchers tested several odours by pairing, for evaluation, 
two vials with mixtures of the same chemical composition but with different names (Table 17.1). 
The result was precisely the one described above: the vast majority of human test subjects (83 
per cent) were able to distinguish the mixtures in each round and attributed different hedonic 
tones (pleasant or unpleasant) to these mixtures. Similar observations have also been made 
regarding the influence of visual clues in olfactory perception (Zellner and Kautz 1990). 
<COMP: INSERT TABLE 17.1 NEAR HERE> 
Herz and von Clef call this effect an olfactory ‘illusion’. While it may count as one 
according to the received view, I find this kind of labelling of perceptual effects theory-laden and 
misleading. The judgement or verdict that something is an illusion conveys an inherent element 
of deception and divergence from how things ‘really’ are. To speak of an illusion in this 
particular experiment seems intuitive only if we consider the distal stimulus as primarily 
responsible for the content of our perceptions. However, the argument of the present chapter 
                                                
7 Theories of embodiment do not seem to provide a good explanation for such cases. 
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showed that this is not the only viable interpretation of the apparently illusionary effects. Quite 
to the contrary, such perceptual biases touch base on what perceptions are. 
Examples like these show that our experience of perceptual qualities is inevitably biased. 
These biases are not necessarily a matter of illusion, hallucination, or deception and must not be 
stripped away in order to get at some underlying form of normal and unbiased perception. In 
fact, there is no such thing as naïve perception. Perceptual biases are rather introduced by 
important factors such as exposure, predilections, and memory. Hence biases mark constitutive 
processes that allow us to understand what perception really is about: the processing of 
contextualized information at the hands of selective attention. 
In recognizing the impact of top-down processes on percept formation, an insufficiently 
elaborated aspect in current debate about the brain as a forecasting machine is the ambiguous 
meanings and varieties of top-down processes such as anticipations.8 As a general term, 
anticipation refers to the ability of an organism to expect, adapt, and react to potential future 
states of the environment. Anticipation is not a homogeneous mechanism, however. It is a 
processing capacity that is commonly associated with a variety of fundamental cognitive 
mechanisms such as inference- and decision-making, prediction, learning, memory, and belief 
                                                
8 As has been pointed out to me by a reviewer, a process model of perception involving anticipation has 
been independently suggested by Bickhard 2009. Bickhard frames representations as an emergent 
feature of perceptual systems and as a result of interactive relations between an organism and its 
environment. Bickhard’s focus is on the relation between anticipation and truth values for the 
representational analysis of perception. Mine is on the role of anticipation in affecting perceptual 
content for understanding and modelling the structure of perceptions, especially in olfaction. Unlike 
me, Bickhard does not seem to distinguish different kinds of anticipatory processes as defined by their 
ecological and action-(in)dependent functions. 
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formation (Butz, Sigaud, and Gérard 2003). Needless to say, each of these processes presents a 
case of Pandora’s box in its own right. 
While anticipatory performances in organisms are ubiquitous, they are not particularly well-
understood phenomena. They are generally considered in systems-biological terms, for instance 
an organism as an anticipatory system is defined as ‘a system containing a predictive model of 
itself and/or of its environment, which allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the 
model’s predictions pertaining to a later instant’ (Rosen 2012: 399). 
What current forecasting models in computational neuroscience focus on is the first part of 
this definition, namely the part where the system generates a predictive model of the stimulus 
environment (Clark 2013). But the second part, where the organism changes state in accordance 
with its anticipations, requires more careful attention than is presently given. By focusing on the 
former, one essentially neglects (a) the phenomenological and functional nature of perceptions as 
an incentive for organismal agency and (b) the ecological relation between perceivers and input 
signals as part of an organism’s environment. 
Indeed, there is a fascinating aspect to this definition of organisms as anticipatory systems. 
Its two parts seem to represent a combination of Neisser (1976) and his dynamic account of 
schemata as part of perceptual cycles with the ecological and exploration-oriented theory of 
affordances advanced by his colleague Gibson (1966), who considered the content of perceptions 
as structured by the interactive relations that an organism forms with its environment.9 It seems 
that a dynamic modelling of said schemata in terms of different kinds of anticipatory processes 
                                                
9 To be sure, Gibson was clearly opposed to schemata, and his idea of ‘direct perception’ seems to be at odds here. 
Nonetheless, one must refrain from a simplistic interpretation of direct realism as a form of the ‘textbook Gibson’ 
syndrome (for detailed analysis of how much Gibson’s ideas have been misrepresented in the psychological 
literature, see Costall and Morris 2015). 
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may work here, as Neisser characterized the causal nature of dynamic anticipatory schemata on 
perceptions as ‘expectancy effects’ (Neisser 1976: 43–6).10  
Anticipatory capacities in organisms clearly structure behavioural and cognitive patterns. 
They further seem to facilitate various kinds of perceptual tasks, tasks that are mirrored in 
organismal behaviour such as general object and environmental feature recognition, or the 
recognition of particular individuals and groups. It is thus indispensable to distinguish different 
types of anticipatory processes in relation to different behavioural patterns and perceptual tasks 
in organisms. 
What are the implications of anticipatory processes for our analysis of perception? The 
answer to this lies in inquiries about what precisely is coded or estimated in top-down 
anticipatory processes and how these anticipations are structured by the task a perception is 
supposed to serve. Anticipatory performances are associated with several prospective 
mechanisms such as sensorimotor action, expectation, and attention processing with and 
behavioural functions such as conditioning and learning. These mechanisms are associated with 
different tasks. When looking at anticipations as shaped by different biological mechanisms, we 
must start by distinguishing their perceptual function: Do we look at anticipations as stabilizing 
perceptual information in order to allow for the execution of an action? Do we analyse 
anticipations as guiding behavioural planning and potential options? Or do we model 
anticipations as attention processes that shape or direct our perceptual focus in order to enable 
learning? 
Addressing such questions requires further disentangling of the notion of ‘anticipation’ and 
of its role in perceptual processing: physiologically speaking, we must consider to what extent 
action-dependent anticipations may differ from action-independent anticipations. In 
                                                
10 I thank Ingvar Johansson for pointing this out to me. A more detailed exploration of this idea must wait 
for another occasion, however. 
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evolutionary–developmental terms, we may ask to what extent anticipatory behaviour is 
structured by the history of the species or by the development of an organism. And, in a 
cognitive modelling context, to what extent are anticipatory estimations further shaped by 
individual experience and learning? All these questions indicate the variety of factors by which 
anticipatory processes may be distinguished and modelled in biological systems. 
The upshot here is that different types of anticipatory mechanisms account for the 
processing of different kinds of information. What all these types of anticipation have in 
common is that they involve a form of prediction of future states, a prediction that is somewhat 
based on prior experience. The key difference between these various forecasting mechanisms is 
the nature of the assertive mechanism in relation to the information being processed. 
From this perspective, we see what it means to say that there is no obvious or intrinsic link 
between a stimulus or stimulus structure and our perception of that stimulus. Rather we have 
adjustable perceptual relations where input cues are integrated in terms of their temporal and 
contextual associations with other external sensory cues, internal hidden states (experience and 
memory-based, or internally inferred), expectations, or predictions, and feedback processes of 
error correction. As a result, the perception of the input and its value is not invariant but highly 
contingent. 
5. Conclusions: Perception as a Measure of Changing Signal 
Ratios and Expectancy Effects 
Higher flexibility in the processing and evaluation of perceptual information such as in olfaction 
makes sense when we think of perception as a dynamic process that organisms use in order to 
navigate in an ever-changing environment. Such navigation commands not only constant 
attention but also choices between different options and behaviourally selective responses to 
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contextual clues. It would actually be catastrophic for most of our choices if we were to perceive 
stimuli in a strict input–output-related fashion, without any regulatory principles that allow us to 
contextualize and discern the subtle differences in these cues before we selectively act on them. 
Olfaction in particular is deeply action-based and is shaped by perceptual biases, which makes 
sensory measurement in olfactory psychophysics notoriously difficult (Keller and Vosshall 2004; 
Barwich and Chang 2015). 
Nevertheless, emphasis on the flexibility and contextuality of perception is not a view of 
‘anything goes’. The governing principles of perceptual processing are bound to the 
physiological organization of organisms, their evolutionary species-specific history, and the 
influence of individual experiences and learning. These processes are contingent but not random. 
After all, we do end up with fairly stable and generalizable perceptions. 
Perceptual stability, as this chapter has put forward, is based on the successful integration of 
stimulus clues into experienced and predictable patterns. The regularity of these patterns reflects 
the ratios, combinations, and proportions of selected features in the environment.11 Their 
perception is further shaped by how these ratios are interpreted within organismal response 
spaces. These spaces represent associations of sensory cues and of their affective options, and 
the nature of these associations depends on the organismal states in which the cues are 
experienced and anticipated. 
Success, as in the successful integration of stimulus ratios within a sensory system, is an 
interesting notion. It inevitably implies some form of evolutionary success. Does success also 
imply a notion of correctness? From a process perspective, I think the answer is not about 
whether it does, but about when it may imply accuracy. As I have argued, an answer cannot be 
approached in terms of odour objects. It must be modelled after the processes that translate distal 
                                                
11 An epistemological argument for the measurement of sensory qualities as structurally relational 
properties is presented in Isaac 2014. 
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into proximal stimulus patterns, and this translation is fundamentally determined by top-down 
processes in term of expectancy effects. 
As for the case at hand, olfaction seems particularly apt to analyse the perceptual relations 
between variable stimulus ratios, selective biases introduced by experience, and behavioural 
responses. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the olfactory system is incredibly 
precise at the level of physical stimulus detection (the smallest chemical impurities can cause 
significant differences in the perception of odour qualities). It is also immensely flexible when it 
comes to stimulus evaluation and integration of olfactory cues into various perceptual contexts, 
on the basis of differences in exposure and experience (i.e. in cases of cross-modal perception, 
verbal labelling, conditioning, personal experience and memory, and so on). This shows that 
perceptual biases are not a failure of the level of sensory detection but an inherent and 
constitutive part of the processing system. 
From a process perspective on perception, perceptual representation is about informational 
content. Such content does not necessarily represent perceptual instances as classes of perceptual 
objects, for instance as ‘odour objects’. Instead we experience ‘odour situations’ that provide a 
measure of how certain cues are related to each other (e.g. temporally, combinatorially, causally) 
and are given a certain value (e.g. pleasant, putrid). What constitutes the informational content of 
odour situations is variable and contingent upon the associations that are formed between certain 
ratios and combinations of inputs and the expected value of their (potential) interactions. Any 
interpretation and the potential for perceptual generalizations of such measures into kinds of 
perceptual qualities is grounded in organismal construction and needs, as well as experience, and 
learning; it is action-relative as well as memory-based and must be understood with respect to 
the interaction of the perceiving organism with its environment. 
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labelling of these mixtures. 
Source: Herz and von Clef 2001 
Odorant Label, session 1 Label, session 2 Hedonic order 
Group 1 
I – B acid parmesan cheese vomit positive, negative 
Menthol chest medicine breath mint negative, positive 
Patchouli musty basement incense negative, positive 
Violet leaf fresh cucumber mildew positive, negative 
Pine oil spray disinfectant Christmas tree negative, positive 
Group 2 
I – B acid vomit parmesan cheese negative, positive 
Menthol breath mint chest medicine positive, negative 
Patchouli incense musty basement negative, positive 
Violet leaf mildew fresh cucumber positive, negative 
Pine oil Christmas tree spray disinfectant positive, negative 
 
